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The 1965 Voting Rights Act: Some Wrongs Still Not Righted
by Neal Devins

Thomas C. McCain, et al.

v.
Charles E. Lybrand, et al.
(Docket No. 82-282)
To be argued October 31, 1983

ISSUES
When Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in
1965, many observers complacently pointed to increasing number of enfranchised black voters and black
public office holders and were satisfied the tides of
discrimination were turning. In fact, the tides were turning more slowly than assumed.
Today, eighteen years after the Act took effect,
courts are still being called upon to interpret its key
provisions.
One of those provisions is section 5, which bars several states, including South Carolina, from changing established election procedures without first getting
approval or ··preclearance" from either the Attorney
General or the D.C. district court.
But what constitutes preclearance under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965? In deciding McCain v.
Lybrand, the Supreme Court will answer that question by
determining whether the Attorney General approved
changes in the voting procedures of Edgefield County,
South Carolina.
The McCain case - by way of an inordinately messy
fact pattern- will determine the respective responsibilities of the Attorney General in reviewing section 5 submissions and of state/local government in preparing
section 5 submissions. Specifically, the Court will address:
I. Whether and under what circumstances the Attorney
General's approval of changes in an election procedure can serve as an implicit approval of any unaltered aspects of the earlier election procedure, and
2. Whether and under what circumstances the Attorney
General can make section 5 preclearance contingent
on future occurrences.

Neal Devins is a research associate at the Institute for Public
Policy Studies, Vanderbilt Universit)', 1208 Avenue South,
Nashville, Tennessee 37212; telephone (615) 322-8540.
Issue No.5

FACTS
As stated in the 1978 Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners, the Attorney
General preclearance procedure was designed as an
alternative to "case-by-case litigation [, which] had
proved ineffective in large part because voting suits had
been 'unusually onerous to prepare' and 'exceedingly
slow' to produce results.'' (453 U.S. 110, 118) Section 5
thus "[shifted] the advantages of time and inertia from
the perpetrators of the evil to its victims." (I d. at 121) In
effect, section 5 eliminates those inventive attempts to
circumvent federal court dictates banning discriminatory voting practices.
Edgefield County, prior to the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act, was governed by a three-member
board of commissioners consisting of an elected supervisor of roads and two members appointed by the governor. In 1966, the state legislature created a threemember county council for Edgefield County with all
three members elected at-large. Although this legislative
measure was subject to preclearance, the state did not
seek appropriate review.
In 1971, the state passed an act which increased from
three to five both the number of residency districts in
and the number of council members from Edgefield
County. This act was submitted to the Attorney General
for preclearance. After requesting and receiving information -including "a copy of the election statute now in
force" -the Attorney General granted preclearance. In
South Carolina, even though blacks were and still are a
majority of the population - but less than a majority of
eligible or registered voters - no black had ever been
elected to the county council.
In June, 1975, South Carolina enacted a law which
transferred some powers from the state legi.slature to
county officials. This Home Rule Act also afforded each
county the opportunity to hold a referendum to determine whether to change its form of government. In the
event no referendum were held, the county would "have
the form of government including the method of election, number, composition and terms of the governing
body most nearly corresponding to the form in effect in
the county immediately prior to that date.'' In August of
1975, the Attorney General precleared the Home Rule
Act "insofar as it authorizes each county and citv to hold
a referendum on the question of the form of its government.'' The Attorney General, howe\·er. noted that additional preclearance would be required by each county
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prior to ··adopt in~ <l form of" ~overnmenl under I his
:\ct." For the Attornev (~eneral. such adoption umslituted a chan~e subject to preclearance.
Edgefield Countv did not hold a referendum under
the Home Rule An hut instead adopted an at-lar~e
eleoion procedure which the Attorney Ceneral rdused
to preclear.
In April. 19HO, the election method in Ed~el"ield
Countv was struck down as unconstitutional. Yet, this
decision was nullified that year when the Supreme
Court held in Cit1• o( Mobile I'. Boldi'Jl, (446 U.S. 55) I hat
proof of discriminatory intent was necessarv in a voter
dilution case. Because of this nullification. blacks in
Edgefield Countv sought to invalidate the at-large election scheme by arguing that the Attorney Ceneral refused to preclear that election system. (Note: Due to the
intervening amendment of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act prohibiting am procedure resulting in denial
or abridgment of voting rights based on race, Edgefield
County blacks are seeking to reinstate the April, 1980
voter dilution judgment. This case is now before the
South Carolina federal district court.)
In May. 1982. the South Carolina district court
upheld Edgefield Countv's at-large election scheme and
that decision was appealed directlv to the Supreme
Court.
The voters had argued. unsuccessfully. that the 1971
preclearance was limited to the changes in residency
districts and number of council members. The district
court, however. held that since the Attorney General
had requested and had received "a copy of the election
statute now in force," it was reasonable to assume that
the Attorney General's review of the 1971 Act "encompassed all aspects of the Act, including the effect of the
at-large with residency requirement voting that had
been implemented in 1966."
The district court also refused to honor the Attorney
General's February. 1979 objection to at-large elections
in Edgefield County, holding that the Home Rule Act
resulted in no change in election procedures and thus
was not subject to section 5 review. The court held that
the Attorney General's limited approval of the Home
Rule A.ct extended not onlv to the holding referendum
(as explicitlv stated), but also to transfers of power which
did not alter county voting procedures. To justify this
holding, the court ruled that the Attornev General's
conclusion that assignments of forms of government
constituted a change subject to preclearance onlv applied to those assignments which resulted in a change in
election procedures.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In Edgefield Countv itself. .\fcCain mav ultimately be
of little practical significance. The related voter dilution
case may invalidate at-large elections under Section :? of
the Voting Rights .-\ct. Yet . .\lcCain is \ery important
insofar as it should establish parameters for understand-

ing the respective rights and responsibilities of both the
Attorney (~eneral and state/local gm·ernment units
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights :\ct.
Although not requiring increased black political representation, section 5 shifted the burden ofjustifying a
change in election procedures to the covered jurisdiction. The McCain case will explicate the nature of the
burden placed on covered jurisdictions as noted by the
United States in an amicus brief. That brief states: "If
jurisdictions are not required to identify changes, [such
as the 1966 change made in Edgefield County] they will
he encouraged to make ambiguous submissions and to
attempt subsequently to exploit the ambiguities." On the
other hand, it seems apparent that the Attorney General
was provided with information detailing the 1966 election procedure.
McCain is also significant because it may hamper the
Attorney General from giving limited preclearance to
section 5 submissions. Under the district court view, the
Attorney General could not give effect to his interpretation of the 1975 limited section 5 preclearance. At the.
same time, since it is unclear whether Edgefield County
changed its election procedures under the Home Rule
Act, it might be inappropriate to grant the Attorney
General unlimited authority to determine what constitutes a change in election procedures under section 5.
ARGUMENTS
For Black Voters
1. A preclearance submission, such as that made in 1971
by Edgefield County, cannot result in approval of
election procedures not contained in the submission.
2. The Attorney General cannot be held to have notice
of information not directly related to the terms of a
preclearance submission.
3. A state-to-county transfer of powers pursuant to a
home rule statute necessarily is a change of procedures subject to section 5 preclearance.
-!. Courts should defer to the Attorney General's interpretation of a limited section 5 preclearance.

For Edgefield County
1. A preclearance request extends to all information
contained in the original submission and any other
information procured at the request of the Attorney
General.
2. The Attorney General can onlv object to ··actual"
changes in election procedures.
3. There must be an explicit delineation of all limitations desired bv the Attorney General in a section 5
preclearance approval.
For Amicus Curiae
At the request of the Court, the United States filed
an amicus curiae brief. The United States's argument
was identical to that made by the black voters.
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